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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
BILLS AND NOTES-DISHONOR BY NO?-<PAY!lrnNT-MARGINAL MEMORANDA
FOR PARTIAL PAYMENTS.-Suit by the holder on the following note:
"$100.00.
Hampden, N. D., Sept. 2, I909.
"On or before Sept. 2, 19ro, after date, I promise to pay to the
order of the Sageng Threshing Machine Company, of Minneapolis,
Minn., one hundred dollars.
"Value received, with interest at 6 per cent.
"(Signed)
ALBERT BENSON.
"$25 will be paid Nov. Ist, I909·
"$25 will be paid Jan. 1st, 1910."
On the back was the indorsement: "April I5, I9l0. Pd. $30" The plaintiff
purchased the note in June, I9l0. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to offer
evidence that he was a holder in due course, and that the fact that the payments referred to in the marginal notations had not been made in full did
not make the plaintiff a purchaser of overdue paper. Robinson and Grace,
JJ., dissenting. Union State Ba11k of Jfi1meapolis v. Benson (N. Dak., I9I7),
I65 N. W. 509.
It is to be observed that the prevailing opinion in the instant case does
not expressly hold that the marginal memoranda are not part of the instrument. Instead, the court argues that the memoranda are not sufficiently
positive in terms to show an intention by the parties to allow the payee or
holder to compel payment of the instalments at the times indicated. In other
words, the notations are deemed merely to indicate a likelihood that the payments will be made at a certain time. Nevertheless, in view of the direct
statement in the notations that "$25 will be paid November Ist, I909," and
that "$25 will be paid Jan. 1st, 1910," the decision amounts to a holding that
such notations are not a part of the instrument to the extent of controlling
or affecting provisions expressed in the body thereof. The rule is well settled that an agreement or memorandum placed on the back of a note before
signing or at the time of delivery is to be considered a part of the note,
even though the effect may be to destroy its negotiability. Kitrth v. Farmers'
& Merchants' State Bank (Kan. 1908), 94 Pac. 798; Bay v. Shrader, 50 Miss.
326; Kalamazoo National Bank v. Clark, 52 Mo. App. 593; Herrick v. Edwards, 106 Mo. App. 633 ; Swaisland v. Davidson, 3 Ont. Rep. 320; Heaton
v. Ainley, 108 Ia. II2; Grimison v. Russell, 14 Neb. 52I. Some courts have
applied the same rule where the memorandum was unsigned. Seymo~tr v.
Farquhar, 93 Ala. 292; Rlake v. Coleman, 22 Wis. 415. And it has been held
that a stipulation printed across the margin of the body of the note that the
note is to be discounted if paid before maturity is effective as a part of the
instrument. National Bank of Commerce v. Feeney, 12 S. Dak. 156. The authorities hold quite generally that marginal figures in the corner of a note are
not a part thereof. Washington County State Bank v. Central Bank & Tmst
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Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 168 S. W. 456; Bell v. Bir111illgha11i tAla. App.), 62 So.
971; Williamson v. Smith, l Cold. (Tenn.) I, 78 Am. Dec. 478; Poorman v.
.Mills, 39 Cal. 345. It should be noted, however, that in none of the cases here
cited, nor in any other which the writer has found, was the sweeping statement of the doctrine as to marginal figures at all necessary to the decision,
since in each case the only point actually to be decided was that the marginal
figures are controlled by the written words in the body of the instrument.
Furthermore, the reason supporting the doctrine that marginal figures form
no part of the instrument is not clear, in view of the extensive use of such
figures, and especially in view of the provision in section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law permitting a reference to the figures in case of ambiguity or uncertainty. With reference to marginal memoranda below the signatures there is a sharp conflict of authority. In support of the view that such
memoranda constitute a part of the note, see Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y.
396 (with an especially good discussion by Mr. Justice Allen); Van Zandt v.
Hopkiiis, 151 Ill. 248; Black v. Epstein, 93 Mo. App. 459; Natio11al Bank of
Commerce v. Feeney, supra; Specht v. Beindorf, 56 Neb. 553 (though it is
not clear in this case whether the provision was written into the note above
or below the signature). In support of the apparent holding of the instant
case that such memoranda do not constitute a part of the note, see· Fisk v.
McNeal, 23 Neb. 726; Danforth v. Stermaii (Ia.), 145 N. 'vV. 485; Becker v.
Hofsom111er, 186 Ill. App. 553. On the whole, it would seem that the cases
taking the latter view are forced to indulge in technical distinctions that lead
to confusion without offering a better method of getting at the real intention of the parties. If memoranda on the back of the note at the time of
execution are to be considered a part of it, it is hard to see why the same
interpretation should not apply to memoranda on the face of the instrument.
Co?.rn:imcE-FEDERAI. EMPI.OYERS' L1ABII.I'tY Acr-PERSONS SuBJEC't-"lN'tERS'tA'tE CoMMERcE".-Plaintiff was employed by an interurban electric railway, operated wholly within the state, which received freight shipped
to and from other states and transported it under through bills of lading.
He was a member of a crew engaged in bonding, or cleaning the ends of
the rails and connecting them by wiring, and was injured in boarding a car
on which the crew rode. Held, that he was engaged in "interstate commerce" within the EMPI.OYimS' LlABJI.I'tY AC't, April 22, lgo8, c. 149, 35 Stat.
65, (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, secs. 8657-8665). Cholerton v. Detroit, J. & C.
Ry. (Mich., 1917), 165 N. W. 6o6.
There is great conflict and contradiction among the authorities upon the
question of when an employee of a common carrier is or is not working
under the provisions of the federal act above referred to. It has frequently
been held that, a carrier which is a link in a through line of road by which
freight is carried into other states is engaged in the business of "interstate
commerce," though its lines may be wholly within one state. Jn re Charge
to Gmnd J11r)', 62 Fed. 828; U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305; Houston Direct Na1Jigatiou Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 8g Tex. l; Norfolk
& W. R. R. Co. v. Co111111011wcalth, n4 Pa. 256. It has also been held that
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the work of keeping the instrumentalities used by the carrier in the conduct
of interstate commerce (its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, roadbed,
track, and other equipment,) in a proper state of repair, while thus used,
is so closely related to such commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a part of it; that, whatever work is a part of the interstate commerce in which the carrier is engaged is interstate commerce under the statute, and the work of repairing and maintaining the instrumentalities engaged
in interstate commerce is such work; that the fact that the instrumentality
may be used in both interstate and intrastate commerce does not prevent the
employment of those engaged in its repair, or in keeping it in suitable condition for use, from being an employment in interstate commerce. Pedersen
v. Del. etc. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146; Zikos v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 179 Fed.
8g3; Eng, v. So. Pac. Co., 210 Fed. 92; Montgomery v. So. Pac. Co., 64 Or.
597; Holmberg v. Lake Shore, etc. R}1• Co., 188 Mich. 6o5. It was on the
basis of"such reasoning as the above that the court in the instant case came
to the conclusion that, being an adjunct to interstate commerce, a means effectuating the passage thereof, the plaintiff was engaged in "interstate commerce" within the meaning of the EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT. See extended
notes in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 52, et seq. and L. R. A. 1915 C, 6o, et seq.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-"BoNE DRv'' ACT.-Plaintiff was arrested and held
in custody solely because charged with having in his possession a bottle of
whiskey, for his own use and benefit, within a prohibition district in the
state of Idaho, in violation of an Idaho statute (Session Laws of Idaho,
1915, ch. II), providing that no person shall have in his possession in a prohibition district intoxicating liquors or alcohol, except for sacramental, scientific, or mechanical purposes, or for compounding or preparing medicine.
Plaintiff sued out a writ of habeas corpus, which was quashed in the State
Supreme Court. Plaintiff then brought this appeal. Held, that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. Crane v. Campbell, 38 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 98.
It was contended by the plaintiff in the instant case that the Idaho statute,
in so far as it undertook to render criminal the mere possession of whiskey
for personal use, conflicted with the "privileges and immunities" and "due
process of law" clauses of the 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
The court held that, since it had been decided that a State has the power
absolutely to prohibit the manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders, and the power to adopt the
measures reasonably appropriate or needful to render the exercise of that
power effectiv, it could not be said that, considering the notorious difficulties
always attendant upon efforts to suppress the liquor traffic, the inhibition
of the possession of liquor was so arbitrary and unreasonable, or so without proper relation to the legitimate legislative purpose, as to be an improper
exercise of the police power of the state. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129;
Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Crowley v.
Christensen, .137 U. S_. 86; Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425; New York e~ rel.
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Silz v. Hesterberg, 2II U. S. 3I; Murphy v. California, 225 U. S. 623. The
step taken by the court in its decision in the instant case was to be anticipated, in view of the recent decisions interpreting the WEBB~K:!;NYON ACT.
ESPIONAGE Acr-PosT 0FFic1"--NoN-MAn.ABI.E MATTER-SEDITious Punr.1CAT10Ns.-On an appeal from an interlocutory order granting a temporary
injunction commanding the defendant, postmaster of the city of New York,
to transmit the plaintiff's publication, "The Masses", through the mails,
held, that it could not be said that the defendant was not warranted in excluding the journal under the authority of the ESPIONAGE Acr OF JUNE 15,
l9I7. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (Cir. Ct. App., Nov. 2, 19I7).
This decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals has the effect of reversing
the decision of the District Court, granting a preliminary injunction, 16
MICH. L. Rr:v. I3I. The court in the instant case held the act to be constitutional, a proper exercise of the police power of the government; that, by it,
Congress authorized and directed the ·Postmaster General not to transmit
certain matter by mail, and to determine whether a particular publication
is non-mailable under the terms of the law, thus requiring him to use judgment and discretion in so determining, and making his decision conclusive
before the courts, save where there appears to be a clear abuse of discretion;
and that no such abuse of discretion appeared in the instant case. The Circuit Court expressly repudiated the decision of the District Court, to the
effect that any action other than a direct advocacy of resistance to the existing law is not a violation of the ESPIONAGE ACT, holding that "if the natural
and reasonable effect of what is said is to encourage resistance to a law,
and the words are used in an endeavor to persuade resistance, it is immaterial that the duty to resist is not mentioned, or the interests of the persons addressed in resistance are not suggested".
EVIDENCE- COMPETENCY oF WITNESSES - CRIMINAI. TR!Ar.s IN FEDERAi.
CoURTs.-Upon the trial of defendants in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York for conspiring to buy and receive
certain checks and letters stolen from duly authorized depositories of United
States mail matter, objection was made to the competency of a witness for
the Government who had been jointly indicted with defendants. The objection was based on the ground that this witness had previously pleaded
guilty to the crime of forgery in one of the New York state courts and had
served a sentence therefor, and, by the common law as administered in New
York at the time of the enactment of the Federal Judiciary Act, these facts
would have rendered the witness incompetent. The objection was overruled
and the witness allowed to testify. Held, this ruling was correct. Rosen et
al. v. United States (1918), 38 Sup. Ct. I48.
In United States v. Reid et al., 12 How. 361, a case which came up from
a Federal court in Virginia and upon which appellants in the instant case
rely, the defendant attempted to call as a witness one who had been jointly
indicted with him for a murder committed on the high seas. The court, in
rejecting the testimony, held that the rules of evidence in force in the respective states when the United States Judiciary Act was passed were to gov-
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ern the procedure in criminal trials in those courts, and that by the laws in
force in Virginia at that time co-defendants were not competent witnesses.
Practically the same doctrine was applied in Logan v. United States, 144
U. S. 263, in which case the court held that the laws of Texas in force when
that state was admitted to the Union must determine the admissibility of
evidence in ·criminal proceedings by the United States government within
that jurisdiction. While some doubt was cast upon the authority of these
cases by the decision in Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325, the precise
point was not involved. In the instant case, however, the same situation
was presented to the court as appeared in the Reid Case. Guided by the
modern conviction that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing
the testimony of all persons of suitable understanding, leaving the credibility
and weight of such testimony to the court or jury, than by excluding the
witnesses as incompetent, Mr. Justice CLARKE felt justified in repudiating
the docfrine of the Reid Case, and concluded "that the dead hand of the
common law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to such cases as we
have here."
HABEAS CORPUS-CUSTODY OF CHILD-VlSl'l'ING.-By deed executed in accordance with the statute, a father transferred his parental authority and
custody over his three-year-old daughter to her grand-aunt, who formally
adopted her. Upon the death of the child's mother, her grandmother brought
suit for the custody of this child and also for that of her sister and two
brothers, making the father and grand-aunt defendants. The court decreed
that the three-year-old child should be left in the care and custody of her
adoptive parents but required them to allow the child to visit one day in
each month in the home of her grandmother, to whom the control of the
other children was awarded. The defendant appealed on the gruond that
the court had no authority to require these visits. Held, the court had such
authority. Kirby et 1tx. v. Morris (Tex., 1917), lg8 S. W. 995.
Appellants did not question the power of the court to award the custody
in toto of the child as its best interests dictated, but objected to the limitation imposed upon their authority requiring visits to the child's grandmother.
Similar limitations seem to be of rather common occurrence in divorce decrees, and, in fact, the court will rarely fail to order that the parents shall
have access to their children at all reasonable times and places. CHURCH,
HABEAS CoRPUS, 449; Wand v. Wand, 14 Cal. 513; Knoll v. Knoll, II4 La.
703; People v. Winston, 65 App. Div. 231. Whether such provisions are made
primarily with reference to the child's welfare, or in recognition of parental
rights, may be an open question. The court in the instant case, basing their
authority to issue this decree on the recognized power of courts to issue
similar decrees in divorce proceedings, seem to assume that visiting is ordered in the interests of the children. A contrary conclusion is indicated by
the case of In re S1tccession of Reiss, 46 La. Ann. 347, in which it was held
that the court had no power to require a father to send his children to visit
their grandmother, although it would seem to have been for their best interests.
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LANDI.ORD AND T1;NAN't-CROPPING CON'tRAC't-COMl'£NSA'tION. - Plaintiff
and defendant entered into an oral contract by which the defendant was to
furnish seed, machinery and land and plaintiff was to farm and irrigate the
land and to receive one-half of all that was raised. · Defendant prevented
full performance. Held, not a contract of employment but in the nature of
a joint adventure, and plaintiff could not recover wages for the period of
actual work. Pace v. Beckett (Col., 1917), l6g Pac. 142.
The legal relation created by such a situation is a question on which the
courts are not agreed. The decisions differ widely as to whether an agreement to cultivate land for a share of the crop involves the application of
the rules of master and servant, or whether it is to be regarded as a joint
adventure in the nature of a partnership, or whether it operates as a lease
of the premises concerned. One hired to work land and receive as compensation part of the produce is a cropper, not a tenant; he has no interest in
the land but receives his share as the price of his labor. Adams v. McKesson,
53 Pa. St. 81. The same conclusion is reached in Warner v. Hoisington, 42
Vt. 94. In James v. James, 151 \.Vis. 78, the court said that the agreement
partakes of the nature of a joint adventure entitling the parties to a chance
in the profits derivable therefrom. In Trinity & B. V. Ry. Co. v. Doke
(Texas), 152 S. \V. n74, it was held, that the relation was that of landlord and tenant, the landlord's share is treated as rent and in the absence
of a stipulation to the contrary, he has no title to the crop until after division.
In Minneapolis Iron Store Co. v. Branum, 36 N. D. 355, it was held that
such a contract creates the relation of landlord and tenant and not that of
master and servant. This case overruled Angell v. Egger, 6 N. D. 391. In
some cases as Steel v. Frick, 56 Pa. 172, the court lays hold of certain words,
"to farm, let, etc.," as evidencing a lease. The test, however, is the intention of the parties, and the instrument is to be read as a whole. Strangeway
v. Eiseiiman, 68 Minn. 395.
01mC£Rs-REcoVI(RY oF SALARY BY De ]UR£ EMPLOY££.-Relator asked
pay "for the time he was illegally laid off as a grain helper", after the only
money appropriated for that office had already been paid bona fide to the
de facto occupant during that time. Held, that relator could not recover his
pay from the city. People ex rel. Sartison v. Schmidt (Ill. 1917), n7 N. E.
1037.
This is the first case in lllinois to decide definitely "t11at payment made in
good faith to a de facto officer constitutes a bar against the city to a claim
for the same salary made by the officer de jure". Bullis v. Chicago, 235 Ill.
472; Kenyon v. Chicago, 135 Ill. App. 227. The prevailing view sanctions the
decision and the reasoning by which it was obtained. Dolan v. Ma·yor, 68
N. Y. 274; Wayne Co1111ty v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176. Contra, Rillk v. Philadelphia, 15 Wkly. Notes Cas. 345, affirmed 2 Atl. 505; Andrews v. Portland,
79 Me. 484; Hogan v. Hamilton County, 132 Tenn. 554. See notes in 19
L. R. A. (N. S.) 794; 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 475; 14 MICH. L. REV. 261, 6og..
"The interest of the community requires that public offices be filled and the
duties of the officers be discharged, and, since in order to secure such serv-
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ice, the officer performing it must ordinarily be paid, payment in good faith
to the officer discharging the duties of the office is justified." The grain
helper in this case is assimilated to a public officer under good authority and
the conclusion follows inevitably. Higgins v. Mayor, 13I N. Y. 128; O'Hara
v City of New York, 28 Misc. Rep. 258, 46 App. Div. 518, 167 N. Y. 567; Van
Valkenburgh v. Mayor, etc., 49 App. Div. (N. Y.) 208; Martin v. City of
New York, 176 N. Y. 371. The employment of this analogy, however, seems
useless: by keeping the mere employee whose position does not rise to the
dignity of an office distinct from the office holder the identical result will be
reached, for a class that receives money without performing any service
therefor is the exception, not the general rule. Instead of forcing the "mere
employees" into the class of officers for the purpose of applying an exception
to the common rule as to officers, it would seem simpler and much less dangerous to recognize the differences between the two. The two classes have
to be distingnished in other respects. A de jure officer may recover the
compensation of the de facto officer, but the de jure employee may not.
Jones v. D11sma1i, 246 Pa. 513; Kidder v. Wilson, 90 Ver. 147· A de fure
officer is entitled to the full amount of his salary without any deduction for
the amount he earned or might have earned while not discharging his official duties. Fitzsimmons v. Brooklyn, 102 N. Y. 536; Andrews v. Portland,
79 Me. 484. Where the position is not strictly an office, however, the rule
is different. Sutliffe v. New York, 132 App. Div. (N. Y.) 831; CoNSTANTIN£AU, Punuc OFFICERS, Sec. 222.
WlLLS-AnEMPTlON.-Testator having power to appoint £10,000 among
his younger children, made his will when he had four such children, appointing it all to them equally; but whether he said £2,500 to each, or equally to
the four, or merely in equal shares, does not appear from the report, it being reported differently in different parts of the statement. Later when he
had five younger children he made an appointment by deed to one of his
daughters on her marriage of £2,ooo "in full discharge" of her share. Held,
that such appointment was an ademption only pro tanto, and that she was
still entitled to £500 out of the residue of £8,ooo leaving only £7,500 for the
other four younger children. Moore's Rents (Land Commission, 1917),
[1917], I Ir. R 244, 51 Ir. Law Times 1o6.
If the court held that a legacy for a certain amount could not be adeemed
by payment of a smaller amount, clearly proved to have been intended by
the testator at the time to be in full satisfaction, it is not supported by the
decision in Pym v. Lockyer, 5 M. & Cr. 29, relied on, and is in conflict with
the general doctrine that ademption is purely a matter of intention of the
testator. Moreover, £2,ooo in cash may have been actually worth more than
£2,500 at the death of the testator.

